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A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD? THE ANTIPODAL EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DISTANCE ON PARTNER SELECTION IN CROSS-BORDER ALLIANCES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Technological alliances have become a popular strategy over the last decades (Gulati, 
1995a; Anand & Khanna, 2000; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Firms form explorative and 
exploitative alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Sarala, Junni, Cooper & Tarba, 2014) to access 
complementary technologies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), reduce uncertainty (Burgers, Hill & Kim, 
1993), enter new markets (García-Canal, Valdés-Llaneza, & Sánchez-Lorda,  2008), spur 
performance (Yamakawa, Yang & Lin, 2011), or improve their strategic options (Weber & Tarba, 
2014). However, as firms rush to leverage these benefits, they often ignore potential losses from 
alliance mismatches (Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2002) that ultimately result in high failure rates 
(Park & Ungson, 1997; Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002). To avoid such outcomes, firms must carefully 
select their partners (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008), especially in international settings (Dacin, Hitt 
& Levitas, 1997; Dong & Glaister, 2006). 
Employing elements from transaction costs economics (TCE) and resource-based theory 
(RBV), prior studies show that successful selection of alliance partners depends on the 
complementarity between them in terms of characteristics and resources (Hitt et al., 2000; Hitt et 
al., 2004; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Others suggest that, despite this need for complementarity, 
partners must share compatible skills, routines, and strategies for the alliance to function well 
(Dacin et al., 1997; Glaister, 1996). Besides the individual characteristics of partnering firms, 
alliances are also subject to agency problems arising from misalignment of SDUWQHUV¶ goals 
(Einsenhardt, 1989), separation of ownership and control mechanisms (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006) 
and project-specific behavior of partners (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Thus, the uncertainty firms 
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face (Beckman, Haunschild & Philips, 2004), level of mutual trust (Gulati, 1995a; Anand & 
Khanna, 2000), social and strategic interdependence (Gulati, 1995b), product and technological 
relatedness (Krammer, 2016), as well as prior commitments to the alliance (Mohr & Spekman, 
1994) have all important implications for the selections of partners.  
In addition to the above firm-specifics, the selection of alliance partners in an international 
context needs to overcome idiosyncratic differences between countries stemming from economic, 
political, legislative, and social factors (Hitt et al., 2000; Parkhe, 2003). Firm behavior does not 
occur in an organizational vacuum (Dacin, Ventresca & Beal, 1999) but is rather nested in the 
institutional environment in which it operates (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Meyer et al., 2009; 
Ambos & Håkanson, 2014; Krammer, Strange, & Lashitew, 2018). As a result, institutional distance 
between home and host country plays an important role in determining different elements of MNE 
strategy, such as entry modes (Lu, 2002), staffing (Gaur, Delios & Singh, 2007), inter-firm 
collaborations (Park & Ungson, 1997) or export activities (He, Brouthers & Filatotchev, 2013).  
Given the existing institutional heterogeneity worldwide (Meyer et al., 2009), it is important 
to understand how institutional distance affects 01(¶Vselection of strategic partners (Hitt et al., 
2005). However, with few exceptions, this issue has yet to receive significant attention in the 
literature. For example, Hitt et al. (2000) identify significant differences in competences sought 
from foreign partners between firms from emerging (i.e., financial resources, assets, technologies) 
and developed economies (i.e., unique competences, local market knowledge). Moreover, Hitt et 
al. (2004) point out that institutional differences are important even among emerging economies 
themselves, and contrast their effects on the partnering preferences of Chinese versus Russian 
managers. These inherent differences are confirmed by more recent studies focusing on the Indian 
(Chand & Katou, 2012) and Chinese subnational contexts (Ahlstrom et al., 2014). Finally, Roy & 
Oliver (2009) show that the selection of foreign partners is contingent on the host-FRXQWULHV¶
regulatory environments, such as the rule of law or control of corruption. While all these studies 
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provide important foundations for understanding the role of institutions in the selection of alliance 
partners, they also exhibit important limitations in terms of generality and scope by being confined 
to few countries and/or single institutional dimensions that fail to capture compellingly the 
considerable institutional heterogeneity across the world (Hitt et al., 2004) and its subsequent 
effects on different types of inter-firm alliances (Kale & Singh, 2009). 
In response to these challenges, I explore partner selection for alliances through the lens of 
TCE theory (Gulati & Singh, 1998), supplemented by institutional (Kostova, 1999) and learning 
(Grant & BadenǦFuller, 2004) rationales. Once a firm identifies a pool of possible international 
partners that are committed, compatible and complementary, it must decide which one(s) to 
actually partner with, and I content that, in addition to firm-specific factors, country-specific 
rationales will also play an important role in this process (Parkhe, 1991). Specifically, I propose 
that firms seeking exploitation will prefer partners from closer cognitive and normative 
environments and similar or superior regulatory ones, given coordination concerns, absorptive 
capacity issues, and appropriation risks that can affect the transfer of technologies and the potential 
for rents from these alliances (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Michailova & Hutchings, 2006; Delerue & 
Simon, 2009; Belderbos, Jacob, & Lokshin, 2018). In turn, I suggest that institutional distance will 
relate positively to selection of partners for exploration, given the increased opportunities for 
learning, cross-feeding, pooling of resources, institutional arbitrage, and lower risks of leakages 
(Gimeno, 2004; Noteboom et al., 2007; Nathan & Lee, 2013). 
These hypotheses are tested using a handǦcollected dataset that covers all firms in the global 
tire industry and their alliances between 1985 and 2003. Following previous studies in this area, I 
focus on horizontal agreements (Mowery et al., 2002; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) for both 
theoretical clarity (Phelps, 2010) and consistency with the particularities of this industry, in which 
technological alliances occur almost exclusively between tire producers (Acha & Brusoni, 2005). 
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The results of the empirical analysis broadly support my conjectures regarding the antipodal effects 
of institutional distance on the selection of international alliance partners. 
Accordingly, this work proposes several contributions. First, it advances the alliance 
literature by theorizing and testing the importance of environmental contingencies, in this case of 
institutional nature, in the process of partner selection. While most prior studies on the selection 
process have paid significant attention to the firm-specific contingencies (Shah & Swaminathan, 
2008; Yamakawa et al., 2011; Weber & Tarba, 2014), our knowledge on the mechanisms through 
which external environments may affect these choices is still very limited, particularly in terms of 
generality and international scope (Ahlstrom et al., 2014). By examining how different institutional 
environments affect the selection of partners in a truly global context (i.e., numerous home and 
home countries), it offers more comprehensive explanations for this phenomenon that advance 
significantly this stream of literature (Hitt et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2004; Roy & Oliver, 2009). 
The second contribution is to examine the process of partner selection by focusing on 
learning objectives of the alliance as an important inducement of this process. In doing so, I 
distinguish between exploitation alliances, which involve the use of technologies already known 
(March, 1991), and explorative ones that aim to develop new technologies or competences for 
securing new strategic opportunities (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Given these fundamental differences, 
my theoretical arguments suggest that institutional distance will have antipodal effects on the 
appeal of partners for exploitative versus explorative interactions. Together these insights extend 
TCE theory by expounding mechanisms through which the institutional background of prospective 
partners may become either a benefit or a liability for a technological alliance, contingent on the 
ODWWHU¶V learning objectives. 
Third, I differentiate the concomitant effects of several institutional pillars on partnering 
decisions, given their different, yet complementary, nature (Scott, 2001). Exploitation of 
technological assets via alliances involves unidirectional transfer of technology from one (focal) 
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firm to its partner(s); as such, it is sensitive to normative (Steensma et al., 2000), regulatory (Oxley, 
1999) and cognitive (Kelly, Schaan & Joncas, 2002) differences between partners, which may 
entail additional costs or opportunities for such alliance. In contrast, institutionally-distant partners 
ZLOOEHPRUHDSSHDOLQJIRUH[SORUDWLRQJLYHQILUPV¶QHHGWRGLYHUVLI\DQGFRPSOHPHQWHDFKRWKHU¶V 
knowledge (Schildt et al., 2005). The empirical results broadly support these antipodal effects of 
different institutional pillars on selection of partners for exploitation versus exploration alliances, 
with the exception of differences in terms normative institutions, which appear to hinder both types 
of endeavors. Consequently, these results support the idea of complex interactions between 
institutions and firm strategies across different institutional pillars, and advance our knowledge on 
these issues b\SURSRVLQJDQGWHVWLQJWKH³GRXEOH-HGJHGVZRUG´HIIHFWRILQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVWDQFHRQ
partner selection for alliances. 
 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY  
 
A central issue for alliance formation is the quest for a suitable partner (Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati, 1995b; Hitt et al., 2000). Surveys confirm that most managers see partner selection as the 
most important factor for alliance success, one that firms should continuously perfect if they are to 
improve the outcome of their alliances (Glaister, 1996). Whereas a thorough selection procedure 
involves careful screening and a commitment of substantial resources, it pays major dividends in 
terms of improving the flow of knowledge, resource and skills into and within the alliance, thereby 
meaningfully increasing the ability of firms to meet their strategic objectives (Geringer, 1991). 
While firm-specific factors (e.g., complementarity, compatibility, trust, strategic 
interdependence, relatedness) present important explanations for a successful selection of alliance 
partners, in international transactions, country-specific factors (e.g., differences in economic 
development, governmental policies) exacerbate the repercussions of a potential mismatch (Dacin 
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et al., 1997; Parkhe, 2003; Dong & Glaister, 2006). Among them, institutional characteristics have 
been found to be particularly relevant for MNE strategies (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Kostova 
& Zaheer, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009), however such factors have rarely been studied in conjunction 
with partner selection, let alone in relation to different alliance types in terms of objectives and 
underlying requirements. 
 
Exploitation and Exploration in Alliances 
Strategic alliances are often formed with the primary purpose of acquiring (i.e., learning 
and absorbing) or providing (e.g., licensing or exchanging) knowledge to partnering firms (Grant 
& BadenǦFuller, 2004). Following March (1991), I distinguish between explorative and exploitative 
knowledge quests and consider their respective alliance ramifications.  
Explorative knowledge involves intense search, high risk, discovery, and the pursuit of 
novelty. It usually takes the organization away from its established and comfortable knowledge 
base, which is expressed in its structure and routines, into new domains and unchartered territory. 
For the firm, exploration holds the promise of long term survival and prosperity, while incurring 
higher costs and a more risk in the short term (Levinthal & March, 1993). Missing on essential tacit 
knowledge, a firm that undertakes an exploratory search has to look outside its boundaries and 
beyond its traditional environmental confines; an alliance partner possessing diverse tacit 
knowledge is likely a suitable source for such knowledge needs (Schildt, Maula & Keil, 2005, 
Phelps, 2010; Krammer, 2016). 
In contrast, exploitation triggers a knowledge search that is much more routine, i.e. planned, 
structured and programmed. This type of search is more focused on process implementation and 
execution rather than on creating something new. Subsequently, the return on investment for 
exploitation, at least in the short term, tends to be more certain and visible, with the promise of 
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steady and predictable, if modest, gains (March, 1991). Given these features, proximity, relative 
similarity and ease of coordination will facilitate the efficient knowledge and coordination and 
execution of exploitative endeavors (Levinthal & March, 1991; Koza & Lewin, 1998). 
The distinction between explorative and exploitative learning has been applied to strategic 
alliances (e.g., Koza & Lewin, 1998), in particular in technology intensive industries where 
learning and technology attainment are key formation objectives. Thus, alliances have been 
classified according to their primary purpose for a focal firm, based on whether the knowledge 
sought from a partner is new, or external to a firm, or is rather intended to leverage and or extend 
the utilization of existing knowledge assets and competencies (Lavie & Rosenkopft, 2006; 
Yamakawa et al., 2011; Sarala et al., 2014; Krammer, 2016). Despite these advances, prior research 
has not sufficiently explained how the choice of alliance partners may differ in an exploratory 
versus exploitative setting and the effects of institutional environments in which alliance partners 
are embedded. These caveats are important because they are intertwined with the strategic 
objectives of the partners and form a pivotal link between firms and their macro-environment (Grant 
& BadenǦFuller, 2004). 
 
Institutional distance and selection of international partners for alliances 
Differences in terms of institutional arrangements across countries can both benefit and 
impede MNE activities abroad. On one hand, these differences present opportunities for 
institutional arbitrage, encouraging exploitation of different capabilities across countries and 
institutional regimes (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Krammer, 2017; Krammer et al., 2018). On the other, 
institutional differences contribute to the liability of foreignness faced by the MNEs in the form of 
unfamiliarity, relational and discriminatory hazards that require additional costs of adaptation to 
foreign host environments (Eden & Miller, 2004). As a result, institutional distance between home 
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and host countries is a good predictor for 01(¶VVWUDWHJLHVLQGLIIHUHQWKRVWPDUNHWV (Henisz & 
Swami Nathan, 2008).  
Concerning partner selection, the impact of institutional distance has received relatively 
little attention, and existing contributions have been confined to few countries and single 
institutional dimensions (Hitt et al. 2000; Hitt et al. 2004; Roy & Oliver 2009; Shi et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, institutional complexity requires a complete examination of all dimensions (i.e., 
cognitive, normative and regulatory) given their potentially different effects and magnitudes on 
various MNE activities. Furthermore, exploitation and exploration through strategic alliances are 
likely to be affected differently by institutional differences between partners.  
Whereas the bulk of the literature views differences in culture and institutions as detrimental 
to cross-border business (Stahl & Tung, 2014), scholars (e.g., Parkhe, 1991) have pointed out that 
such differences can also be beneficial. Some suggestions have been made as to when differences 
were likely to produce a benefit or a handicap, however those proposals have centered on the 
differences in each set of features, and their complementarity or conflict potential (Shenkar & Zeira, 
1992). Still, studies have not dwelled on how institutional differences matter to different types of 
alliances based on their strategic learning aims, in this case, on how exploration versus exploitation 
might produce a different impact for institutional gaps. Therefore, our understanding of these issues 
could be improved by focusing on the three pillars of institutional distance proposed by Kostova 
(1999) ±i.e., cognitive, normative and regulatory- and distinguishing between these two central 
types of alliances (March, 1991). In this way, this study can provide a more comprehensive answer 
regarding the effects of different institutional factors on partner selection, and their relative 
importance for MNEs seeking technological allies. 
My starting point is that explorative and exploitative alliances are fundamentally different 
in nature and should therefore relate differentially to institutional differences between prospective 
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partners. Institutional differences can be identified across three areas, often referred to as 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO³SLOODUV´6FRWW001). The first two (i.e., normative and cognitive) pillars capture tacit 
and informal aspects that describe how societal actors operate in a certain environment (Gaur et al., 
2007). Normative aspects describe legitimate ways to achieve goals (Scott, 2001), while cognitive 
aspects reflect different schemas, frames, beliefs and inferences on how the world operates 
(Kostova, 1999). Both reflect institutional aspects that are deeply embedded in the normal 
functioning of a society. ThusILUPV¶DFWLRQVDUHhighly representative of their home normative-
cognitive environments since they often abide and implement these rules unconsciously (He et al., 
2013).  
Nevertheless, given their similarity and overlap, distinguishing between cognitive and 
normative aspects of institutions in practice is a daunting task (Scott, 2001). The cognitive 
dimension is commonly identified with cultural values and beliefs (Estrin et al., 2009; Bae & 
Salomon, 2010; He et al., 2013). Defined as the ³FROOHFWLYH SURJUDPPLQJ RI WKH PLQG´ WKDW
identifies different groups of people, national culture provides a common frame for individuals to 
relate to organizations, the environment, and their peers (Hofstede, 1980). In turn, the normative 
dimension has been closely linked to the development of professional standards and educational 
curricula, and previous studies have conceptualized it using measures of managerial abilities, norms 
and practice (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Xu et al., 2004; He et al., 2013). Thus, I focus on the 
potential mismatch in terms of managerial norms and cultural values as two cognitive-normative 
elements that are relevant for the selection of alliance partners. Moreover, I consider cognitive 
(cultural) and normative (managerial) distance between partners to be symmetric and dyadic in 
nature (Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012), enabling me to assess the extent of differences 
between partners, however without being able to rank them. 
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The third (i.e., regulatory) component of the institutional environment includes codified 
rules that govern economic interactions (North, 1990). These formal institutional components (i.e. 
laws, regulations, policies) vary significantly across countries, and affect all inter-firm international 
interactions (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Out of many potential institutional elements to be considered, 
I focus on a specific regulatory aspect, namely intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR are 
commonly defined as the exclusive rights given to a creator or inventor over the use of it over a 
limited period of time. Prior studies have shown that IPR regulations are intrinsically linked to 
innovation performance (Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002; Krammer, 2009; Cockburn, 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2016), commercial ability (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2001), ability 
to capture rents (Khoury & Peng, 2011), and firm strategies and governance of technological assets 
and relationships (Zhao, 2006; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007). Thus, given this cardinal influence of 
IPR on technological aspects, I argue that regulatory differences in terms of IPR will influence 
partner selection in international alliances with a technological component. 
Unlike the cognitive and normative elements of the institutional environment, regulatory 
distance between home and MNE host country is asymmetric and the direction matters (Zaheer et 
al., 2012). Thus, in contrast to cognitive-normative distance, for regulatory differences I can assess 
both how different the two partners are, and which one is better. Albeit globalization and increased 
economic integration have contributed to the convergence of regulations worldwide, countries still 
exhibit significant heterogeneity in terms of IPR (Park, 2008; Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher & Shi, 
2017). Some of these differences involve important IPR aspects such as legal protection, actual 
enforcement, and coverage of these laws. By considering both the magnitude and the direction of 
this relationship between countries, I emphasize both how, and how much they differ in terms of 
IPR regulations. In turn, the magnitude and direction of these IPR differences may favor or hinder 
alliance activities across borders. Hence, upon considering a set of potential alliance partners, the 
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MNE can assess each of them as either having stronger (i.e. positive distance) or weaker (i.e. 
negative distance) regulatory institutions vis-à-vis its home-country environment. 
 
One Edge of the Sword: Institutional Distance as a Hindrance for Exploitation 
There are several reasons for which MNEs would prefer partners from closer cultural and 
managerial backgrounds for exploitative technological alliances. First, managers face significant 
coordination concerns upon establishing new alliances. These concerns stem from increased 
interdependence between partners and the logistics of alliance activities (Gulati & Singh, 1998); 
they include communication and decision costs that are contingent upon the cognitive-normative 
mismatch of partners (Delerue & Simon, 2009). Second, cultural and managerial proximity is 
commonly associated with intrinsic attractiveness and trust, which facilitate the transfer of 
technology between partners (Michailova & Hutchings, 2006). Technical knowledge has a major 
tacit component and is often embedded in people and organizations (Volkof, Strong & Elmes, 
2007), thus trustful and attractive potential partners stand a better chance of being selected as 
technological allies. Finally, successful assimilation of technology demands certain absorptive 
capabilities (e.g., trained employees, knowledgeable managers, efficient routines, etc.) from 
potential collaborators (Mowery et al., 2002). Firms from closer normative-cognitive backgrounds 
have similar cognitive schemas and managerial dispositions regarding the use and share of 
technical knowledge, which will be easier to understand and adopt by the MNE (Xu et al., 2004) 
facilitating also the absorption of technology by partnering firms (Pisano, 1990). Therefore, they 
will be more appealing as partners for exploitation alliances (Grant & BadenǦFuller, 2004). 
In contrast, more distant firms in terms of managerial and cultural background, will be less 
attractive as alliance partners, given that the MNE will need to devote additional resources to 
understand and deal effectively with these cognitive-normative differences (Chan & Makino, 
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2007). When dealing with such distant partners, the MNE needs to commit additional resources to 
tailor their alliance capabilities (Kale & Sigh, 2002) and bridge these differences (e.g., via new 
routines, work ethics, management training programs, upgrades of technological skills, etc.) for the 
alliance to succeed. As a result, coordination costs rise and impose greater uncertainty on both 
partners, which ex-ante make distant exploitative alliances seem riskier and costlier for the MNE 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998). Furthermore, cultural and managerial distance leads to less cooperation 
and knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 1996) impeding the proper flow of technical knowledge 
between partners. Familiarity with local norms and behaviors is tacit and requires additional efforts 
from the MNE to secure full cooperation from its partners and fluidize the flows of knowledge in 
the alliance via common organizational routines (Kostova, 1999). Finally, cognitive-normative 
differences reduce the absorptive capability of partners to transfer and implement successfully 
technology from the MNE, given their different ways (e.g., cognitive schemas and managerial 
dispositions) of sharing and using technical knowledge. Such normative-cognitive differences can 
impose significant constraiQWVRQILUPV¶RWKHUDFWLYLWLHVand are a leading cause of alliance failures 
(Park & Ungson, 1997; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Therefore, when engaging a distant cognitive 
(cultural) and normative (managerial) partner for exploitation, the MNE will face higher adjustment 
costs and greater uncertainty regarding the alliance. Thus: 
H1: All else equal, when forming a technological alliance for exploitation, the MNE will 
prefer partners from closer normative and cognitive environments. 
 
Furthermore, there are several rationales for which a MNE seeking international partners 
for an exploitative technological alliance will prefer firms from countries with similar or stronger 
regulatory environments (i.e., IPR). First, similar or stronger IPR regulations UHGXFH 01(¶V
appropriation concerns, thereby improving its ability to capture greater rents from the alliance 
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(Gulati & Singh, 1998) and benefit more from co-specialization of partners (Gimeno, 2004). 
Second, IPR facilitates the transfer of technology between partners by providing a global 
institutional framework for specialized markets for technologies, where firms can exploit their 
knowledge-intensive assets via licensing and other commercial tools (Arora et al., 2001). Finally, 
countries with similar or superior IPR regimes than that of the MNE will facilitate an efficient 
transfer of technology given their compatible IPR standards (Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2008) and similar 
innovation capabilities (Krammer, 2009). In turn, these will LQFUHDVH 01(¶V RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU
exploitation via technological alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Yamakawa et al., 2011; Peng 
et al., 2017). 
In contrast, the MNE will be more wary of having partners from countries with weaker (i.e., 
less stringent) IPR regulations when forming an exploitation alliance, given the high appropriation 
concerns (Gulati & Singh, 1998), reduced benefits from co-specialization (Gimeno, 2004), and 
difficulties in the transfer and commercialization of technologies (Branstetter et al., 2006; 
Krammer, 2009). Within an alliance, the scope of technical knowledge transferred to partnering 
firms is difficult to limit and monitor by the MNE, requiring costly alliance functions (Kale & 
Singh, 2002) and raising concerns about free riders and technology leakages (Pisano, 1990; 
Krammer, 2016). These concerns are further inflated by weaker IPR regulations that facilitate 
technology leakages to domestic firms (Teece, 1986) and lower MNE ability to capture rents from 
exploitation of its current technological assets (Khoury & Peng, 2011)1. Furthermore, worse IPR 
regulations than the home-country ones will interfere with MNE¶V ability to transfer technology to 
its partners. In such cases, lower IPR standards increase will 01(¶V perceived costs of sharing 
                                                           
1
 For example, in 2009 the US International Trade Commission has estimated that American firms in China lost 
around $48.2 billion because of such IPR violations. 
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technology by raising incompatibility issues in terms of dealing with intellectual property (Gans et 
al., 2008), and exposing them to threats of imitation or expropriation (MartinezǦNoya & GarciaǦ
Canal, 2011). As a result, firms from countries with worse regulatory environments compared to 
WKH 01(¶V KRPH LQVWLWXWLRQV ZLOO EH OHVV DWWUDFWLYH DV SDUWQHUV IRU D WHFKQRlogical alliance 
(Contractor & Ra, 2002). In sum, MNEs will seek to partner up in exploitation alliances with firms 
that are better or, at least, close in terms of regulatory provisions to their home environments. Based 
on all these arguments, I hypothesize that: 
H2: All else equal, when forming a technological alliance for exploitation, the MNE will 
prefer partners from similar or stronger regulatory environments.  
 
The Other Edge of the Sword: Institutional Distance as an Advantage for Exploration 
I expect differences across institutional background to also affect partner selection for 
explorative alliances, though in different ways, and possibly at varying magnitudes. When 
searching for new knowledge through exploratory alliances, the MNE is implicitly committing 
itself to enter new domains and tap uncharted territories (Grant & BadenǦFuller, 2004). While 
exploration is by definition a risky endeavor, pursuing partnerships in distant cognitive and 
normative backgrounds, it provides both the MNE with the potential to learn new routines and 
unique solutions which are often rooted in local and national contexts (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 
1998). This diversity often stimulates managers to be more creative in terms of identifying and 
dealing with problems, thereby improving the efficiency and coherence of their decisions (Gomez-
Mejia & Palich, 1997). Moreover, cognitive and normative heterogeneity is often associated with 
greater creativity and innovation (Cox and Blake, 1991), allowing firms to break certain 
organizational rigidities and develop new sources of knowledge (Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; 
Stahl et al., 2010). Thus, diversity in terms of cultural backgrounds and managerial practices 
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facilitates successful exploration endeavors, both in terms of innovative and international activities 
(Nathan & Lee, 2013). 
Furthermore, cognitive and normative differences will be positively related to partner 
selection for exploration simply because they are desirable when a firm is looking to import a 
different knowledge set. The specialized roles and routines of well-established MNEs tend to 
reduce the exploration opportunities of individuals in these firms (Sorensen, 2007), resulting in 
reliance on exploitative rather than explorative avenues to sustain performance (Fosstenløkken, 
Løwendahl, & Revang, 2003). Given that both cognitive and normative differences are tacit, 
symmetric and dyadic (Zaheer, Schomaker & Nachum, 2012), they meet well the challenges 
involved in absorbing a new, uncodified knowledge base. Technical knowledge, when exploratory, 
has a strong tacit component (Volkof, Strong & Elmes, 2007), and therefore the more cognitively 
and normatively different partners will be, the more opportunities for exploration will exist within 
the alliance.  
Finally, cognitive and normative distance between partners provides access to more 
heterogeneous resources that increase the overall absorptive capacity of the alliance. The successful 
assimilation of knowledge requires potential collaborators to poses good absorptive capabilities, 
e.g., R&D activities, trained employees, knowledgeable managers, and efficient routines (Mowery 
et al., 2002). While people that have been raised in different environments tend to understand and 
evaluate differently operational problems, this distance is particularly useful in the case of 
exploration alliances (Noteboom et al., 2007), where learning and cross feeding are critical for 
overcoming the limitations of contextually localized searches (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). Thus, 
a cognitive-normative distant partner who brings into the alliance people who are differentially 
socialized, may be deemed especially useful in the context of an exploratory alliance. Subsequently, 
I posit that: 
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H3: All else equal, when forming a technological alliance for exploration, the MNE will 
prefer partners from distant normative and cognitive environments. 
 
The effects of regulatory distance on the selection of partners for exploration alliances can 
arguably be both positive and negative. On one hand, despite embracing ex-ante the uncertainty 
and risks associated with exploration, MNEs may still seek partners that are similar or better ranked 
in terms of IPR protection (Gulati, 1998). Thus, despite dealing with nascent technologies or 
fundamental knowledge that is of mostly tacit nature, the risks of leakage and loss of potential rents 
may still drive MNEs towards partners that are perceived to be closer in terms of regulatory 
prescriptions to minimize their appropriation concerns (Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014). Second, 
similar or stronger IPR standards adopted by prospective partners will reduce communication and 
development costs (Gans et al., 2008) typically associated with exploratory endeavors (e.g., a joint 
R&D alliance). Having such IPR standards will allow specialists in the alliance to convert 
sophisticated specialized knowledge into directives, rules, and operating procedures that can be 
easily transferred between partners, and later on integrated into innovative products and services 
(Grant & BadenǦFuller, 2004). Finally, having partners from closer regulatory environments will 
reduce the costs associated with the exploration portfolio of the MNE. As alliances become a 
primary vehicle for seeking new knowledge and technologies, many MNEs have developed large 
portfolios of partners that involve significant management costs and resources (Kale, Dyer, & 
Singh, 2002).  While firms with such dedicated ³alliance functionV´ achieve better financial results 
and higher success rate for their alliances, the costs required to maintain these functions increases 
ZLWKKHWHURJHQHLW\RISDUWQHUVLQDILUP¶VSRUWIROLRHence, distant regulatory partners contribute 
directly to these costs, making them less attractive for exploration. Therefore: 
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H4a: All else equal, when forming a technological alliance for exploration, the MNE will 
prefer partners from similar regulatory environments.  
 
Alternatively, there are several grounds as for why regulatory differences may be helpful 
for MNEs seeking exploratory alliances. First, regulatory IPR differences may enable companies 
to leverage rules and regulations that are conducive to the development of new knowledge to the 
MNE, e.g., more liberal clinical trials for a pharmaceutical company in a country with more 
liberal/unregulated markets (Ghauri & Rao, 2009). In this way, the opportunities for institutional 
arbitrage are greater (Gaur et al., 2007), and will benefit directly the search for knowledge by 
allowing the MNE more leeway in its exploration endeavors. Second, with respect to appropriation 
concerns, IPR gaps are less threatening to a firm in exploratory alliances because appropriability is 
less of a risk due to tacitness and fluidity of technological knowledge (Martinez-Noya & Garcia-
Canal, 2011). Thus, distant partners in IPR do not translate automatically in lower ability of MNEs 
to capture rents from the potential technological gains of an exploratory alliance  (Gimeno, 2004). 
Finally, given the nature of the sought benefits (e.g., tap into new sources of technologies, cross-
feed across very different technological assets or portfolios) the knowledge transfer between 
partners will rely less on codified information (which falls directly under the regulations of IPR) in 
favor of tacit one, embedded in people and organizations (Volkof et al., 2007). As a result, greater 
IPR distance, regardless of its direction (i.e., positive or negative) can improve the attractiveness 
of a firm as an alliance partner for exploration. I therefore propose that: 
H4b: All else equal, when forming a technological alliance for exploration, the MNE will 
prefer partners from more distant regulatory environments. 
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METHOD 
 
Setting, sample and data 
To test these hypotheses, I use data on firms from the global tire industry. I focus on this 
industry for a number of reasons. First, over time, tire producers have formed numerous horizontal 
strategic alliances, providing a rich environment for studying partner selection. Second, this is a 
truly global industry, with firms in more than eighty countries, capturing greater institutional 
heterogeneity than the "usual suspects" in the alliance literature (i.e., highǦtech sectors, confined to 
few developed nations). Finally, technology has always played an important role in this industry, 
especially at the top where significant R&D efforts take place (see Table 1). An in-depth analysis 
of patenting activities by leading tire manufacturers supports this conjecture and suggests that these 
industry leaders maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities which helps them to integrate various 
streams of knowledge and technologies (Acha & Brusoni, 2005). Moreover, technological 
capabilities have always played a critical role in the tire industry, shaping its historical evolution 
(Klepper & Simons, 2000) and triggering new managerial responses (Sull, 2001) and international 
dynamics (Ito & Rose, 2002). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The dataset employed in this study is comprised of data on all tire producers worldwide, 
manually collected from various issues of the European Rubber Journal (ERJ)2. Since partnering 
in a technological alliance is the dependent variable, I limit the sample to the years for which this 
information is available from these journals, namely 1985 to 20033. To estimate partnering choices, 
                                                           
2
 These agreements have been cross-checked with alliance and joint-YHQWXUHGDWD IURP7KRPVRQ¶V SDC Platinum, 
however the ERJ data is much richer in documenting all technological interactions. 
3
 After 2003 ERJ has stopped providing information on technological alliances. 
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I construct a dataset of all possible dyads between firms in the industry over this period4. I then add 
to this data other firm characteristics (e.g., size, age and ownership) for both members of the dyad, 
also from ERJ.  
In addition, I have manually collected data on tire-related patents assigned to these firms 
from Derwent Innovation Index (ISI Thomson), which has wide international coverage from 
multiple national patent offices. To assemble the patent data, I identify all patents assigned to tire 
producers and their affiliates that refer to tire products or processes. Using this information, I 
compute firm knowledge stocks in the ³WLUHV´GRPDLQDVVXPLQJDQDQQXDOGHSUHFLDWLRQUDWHRI
percent to discount their commercial and scientific relevance over time (Griliches, 1990). For firms 
that do not hold patents, I assume a null stock of technological knowledge. Analyzing the 
annouQFHPHQWRIILUPV¶DOOLDQFHVDFWLYLWLHV(ERJ), I identify whether an MNE (i.e., the focal firm) 
selects a partner in a dyad to form either an exploitative or an explorative technological alliance 
(coded as 1, and 0 otherwise). Following the text of these announcements, I identify the focal firm 
in a dyad to be the one that provides technology to its partner for exploitation, and respectively the 
firm taking the lead role in exploration alliances. For dyads with firms that do not form a 
technological alliance (i.e., no alliance announcement available), I consider the focal firm to be the 
one with the larger knowledge stock (i.e., granted patents) of the two. In case both firms have the 
same number of patents, the first firm listed in the dyad is arbitrarily considered the focal one. 
Lastly, I match the firm-level data with country characteristics such as gross domestic product 
                                                           
4  This excludes data from the first three years available (1986-1988), which are used to compute the ³previous alliance 
experience´ of partners YDULDEOHGHVFULEHGLQWKHVXEVHFWLRQ³&RQWUROV´ Thus, there are on average about 220 active 
firms in the tire industry each year, yielding around 385,000 potential undirected dyadic observations (220 times 219, 
divided by 2 then multiplied by 16 years), before discarding missing observations. 
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(GDP), GDP growth, geographic distance, institutional distances, colonial ties, and economic ties. 
Firms from countries where these data were not available have been dropped from the sample. 
Dependent variable. Data on technological alliances between tire producers worldwide 
come from various issues of the Global Tire Report published in the European Rubber Journal 
(ERJ). Following prior work on technological alliances, I focus on the horizontal dimension of 
these agreements (Mowery et al., 2002; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010). 
This is consistent with theoretical arguments for clarity (Phelps, 2010) that favor horizontal 
alliances as a venue for technological exploitation and exploration, the unavailability of complete 
data on the population of firms in other industries (i.e., for vertical alliances), and the massive 
concentration of tire technologies within the industry with few outside players involved (Acha & 
Brusoni, 2005). Hence, I examine the horizontal selection of international partners for 
technological alliances, either exploitative or explorative, as described in the original ERJ text.  
Following the literature (Lavie & Rosenkopft, 2006; Yamakawa et al., 2011), I capture both 
exploitative alliances, which involve "the use and development of things [i.e., technologies] already 
known" (March, 1991) and explorative alliances, which aim to create new-to- the-firm resources 
and competences in a desire the seize new strategic opportunities (Koza & Lewin, 1998). I consider 
several types of exploitative alliances (i.e., long-term agreements involving joint marketing, 
service, OEM, licensing, supply and joint-production deals) in which the focal firm (i.e., the MNE) 
provides existing technologies to its partners in exchange for certain benefits (e.g., access to 
production facilities, services, etc.) and explorative alliances (i.e., R&D alliances, R&D joint-
ventures, and long-term cross-licensing deals), which are commonly forged for explorative 
purposes such development of technology standards, solving of technical issues or technological 
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collaboration5. Thus, my dependent variable (Partner selection) is a binary dependent variable that 
equals 1 if the two firms in a dyad form a cross-border technological alliance in a year for 
exploitation (Exploit) and respectively, exploration (Explore) purposes, and zero otherwise. Multi-
partner alliances are treated as separate dyads for consistency. However, such agreements are 
extremely rare in the tire industry and tend to be exclusively geared towards exploration between 
top firms working on new technologies or seeking to promote new industry standards. The number 
of active alliances in the industry has steadily increased from 75 alliances in 1985 to 113 in 2003, 
with 81% forged for exploitative reasons. In terms of geographic distribution, I can see a 
concentration of technologies in the Triad countries (i.e., EU, Japan and the USA), which dictates 
pretty much the distribution of partners for exploration alliances (with the exception of several 
alliances with South Korean firms). In turn, the exploitative alliances are much more heterogeneous 
with partners, especially at the receiving end of these technologies, covering emerging markets 
from Asia, Africa and also Eastern Europe. Therefore, this heterogeneity justifies adopting a 
continuous measure of distance, as opposed to looking at average distance between blocks of 
countries (Beugelsdijk & Mudambi, 2013). Finally, given that I consider all possible dyads between 
all firms in the industry, the number of instances in which the DVs take the value of 1 is extremely 
small (0.18% for exploitation and 0.02% for exploration) mandating corrections for rare-events, as 
described in the next section. 
Independent variables. Following previous studies (Gaur et al., 2007; Estrin et al., 2009; 
He et al., 2013), my measure of the cognitive environment focuses on national culture differences 
as a determinant of alliance decisions (Steensma et al., 2000, Delerue & Simon, 2009). I compute 
                                                           
5 Concerning location of alliances, this is not an issue for all contractual agreements, distance being computed between 
the home countries of the two partners. However, in the case of JVs I do take into account specifically the location of 
the new entity based on the information provided by ERJ and use it for computing respective distances. 
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D FXOWXUDO GLVWDQFH LQGH[ XVLQJ +RIVWHGH¶V ILYH GLPHQVLRQV RI FXOWXUH +RIVWHGH et al., 2010) 
extracted from the website: http://www.geertǦhofstede.nl. Together, these dimensions capture 
potential cognitive conflicts between alliance partners that stem from national differences in respect 
for authority [power distance], trust and job security [uncertainty avoidance], independence and 
the role of government [individualism], importance of family and work [masculinity], and future 
expectations [longǦterm orientation] (Shenkar, 2001).  
My measure for the normative environment focuses on international management practices 
and reflects how inter-firm transactions are conducted across countries. Similar measures 
employing managerial attitudes and norms were used by other studies examining ownership (Xu et 
al., 2004) and MNE export strategies (He et al., 2013). Following them, I consider nine managerial 
QRUPV&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD UHWULHYHGIURP ,0'¶V:RUOG&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV<HDUERRN, which 
are relevant for partnering decisions in an international context: competence, credibility, efficiency 
of corporate boards, employee training, flexibility and adaptability, international experience, social 
responsibility and worker motivation6. Given the potential overlap between these variables, I 
perform exploratory factor analysis to determine the normative dimension (Table 2). Subsequently, 
variables with uniqueness above 0.6 are removed, and from the remaining seven items (alpha 
=0.93) I derive a principal component (Eigenvalue= 4.53) for the latent variable that captures 
average managerial norms in a country7.  
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                           
6
 For example, in terms of managerial competence, Israel, USA and Switzerland score the highest, while Croatia, 
Bulgaria and Peru are the lowest. 
7
 Using command factortest in Stata I SHUIRUP DGGLWLRQDO WHVWV %DUWOHWW¶V VSKHULFLW\ .DLVHU-Meyer-Oklin sample 
adequacy) to assess the appropriateness of factor analysis, all with satisfactory results.  
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Mirroring prior studies (e.g., Krammer, 2009; Cockburn et al., 2016) the technologyǦ
specific regulatory elements are measured using global data on intellectual property rights (IPR). 
,35 GDWD FRPHV IURP 3DUN¶V  DQG FRYHUV ILYH FUXFLDO DVSHFWV RI ,3 H[WHQW RI FRYHUDJH 
(patentability of different products), membership in international agreements (e.g., TRIPS, 
international patent conventions), enforcement options (e.g., injunctions, infringements), 
restrictions on patent rights, and duration of protection. This index is computed as a weighted 
average of these five dimensions and covers 122 countries over the period 1960Ǧ20058. The 
frequency of observations is every five years, and values have been linearly interpolated under the 
assumption that these laws do not vary significantly within this interval.  
Data on cognitive and normative institutions are used to compute dyadic (symmetric) 
distances between two countries using the Mahalanobis formula (Berry et al., 2010)9. Regulatory 
distance between countries is computed as a simple difference between the IPR score of the focal 
firm (i.e., the MNE) and its prospective partner in a dyad. This distance is asymmetric and in this 
FDVHGLUHFWLRQFRXQWVKHQFHWKHSDUWQHUFDQEH³stronger´ (positive value) RU³Zeaker´ (negative 
value) vis-à-vis the MNE (Zaheer et al., 2012). Both regulatory and normative distances vary over 
time to accommodate potential institutional dynamics (Frantianni & Oh, 2009). Given that I have 
multiple reference countries when computing these distance measures within a dyad, I do not 
include level effects (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & Roth, 2017). 
Controls. I include several other variables that are closely related to alliance partner 
selection.  Firm size and age (experience) are two important determinants of its strategy (Kale & 
Singh, 2009). Firm size differential is computed using the production capacity of firms within a 
                                                           
8
 USA, Netherlands and Japan have the strongest IPR provisions, while Burma, Angola and Guyana have the weakest. 
9
 The correlation between the Euclidian distance and the Mahalanobis one is fairly high (0.69 for cognitive and 0.70 
for normative) and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that either one can be successfully employed in this case. 
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dyad, while fLUPV¶DJHGLIIHUHQWLDO is determined using the opening year of their first plants. To 
capture the strategic interdependence between firms (Gulati, 1995b) in terms of technologies, I 
calculate the firm knowledge differential XVLQJILUPV¶DQQXDOSDWHQWVWRFNVcomputed from Derwent 
Innovation Index with a 15% annual depreciation rate (Griliches, 1990). To control for benefits 
from prior or current equity links between firms in a dyad, several dummies are included for cases 
in which partners are majority, minority ownerships or jointǦventure projects. Another important 
motivation for international exploitative alliances is to access new, dynamic markets (Glaister, 
1996). At the country level, market size differential and market growth differential are computed 
using GDP figures for both countries involved, extracted from the World Penn Tables 7.1. 
Furthermore, a common proxy for external uncertainty in international business is geographic 
distance (Berry et al., 2010). To account for this, I use a more refined measure of geographic 
distance (weighted by population) between countries obtained from the CEPII database. This 
distance corrects for agglomeration effects (e.g., economic and population terms) within countries 
that might bias upwards the coefficient of a simple geodesic distance. TR FRQWURO IRU ³ERUGHU
HIIHFWV´ known to impact economic exchanges between countries (Schulze & Wolf, 2009), I 
employ a dummy for geographic contiguity (CEPII). Finally, a critical ingredient for alliances is 
the existence of dedicated capabilities (Kale & Singh, 2002). I proxy these capabilities using 
previous alliance experience (calculated as the cumulative number of alliances for both firms in a 
dyad in the 3 previous years) and a partner-specific experience dummy (prior interactions), which 
captures whether the two firms in a dyad have previously engaged in other alliances.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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Estimation technique 
The unit of analysis is the dyad, and I consider all undirected pairs of firms in the tire 
industry for which data on all explanatory and control variables is available. For consistency, I use 
the listwise deletion method to deal with missing observations and preserve the same sample across 
different empirical specifications. After eliminating all missing observations for these variables, 
we are left with a sample of 204,366 dyadic observations. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 
all variables. Analyzing firm dyads increases significantly the dimension of the dataset, but also 
introduces an additional problem: given the very low (only 0.18 percent for exploitation and 0.02 
for exploration) number of 1s in the data, running a regular probit or logit estimation will 
underestimate the probability of selecting a partner for both types of technological alliances. Thus, 
I employ a rare-event logit model that relies on maximum likelihood estimation and generates 
coefficients with lower mean square errors than the standard model by correcting for rare-events 
(King & Zeng, 2001). Moreover, since the data contain all possible dyads among these firms across 
time, it faces potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation. To deal with 
this, I follow Wang & Zajac (2007) and use robust standard errors clustered on each dyad in all 
estimations. Time dummies are added to all estimations. 
A second major concern regarding the partner selection process in alliances refers to 
endogeneity. Many studies have investigated partner selection by estimating regressions using a 
sample of observed alliances, under the assumption that the selection process is independent of the 
firm characteristics. However, it is likely that these characteristics affect both the decision to engage 
LQDWHFKQRORJLFDODOOLDQFHDQGWKDWRIZKRPWRSDUWQHUZLWK7KXVWKHIRUPHULVDUHVXOWRIDILUP¶V
own characteristics (e.g., range of available technologies, market potential, experience etc.), while 
the latter depends on the characteristics of both prospective partners. To deal with these 
endogeneity concerns I use a two-stage correction procedure (Heckman, 1979). Using probit 
  
26 
analysis, the first stage estimates the probability of a firm to engage in technological alliance as a 
function of its size, age, patent stocks, home market size and dynamics. In this first stage the unit 
of analysis is the firm. In the second stage, using a rare-event logit estimator, I analyze whether 
firms choose partners systematically based on different firm and country specifics. To correct for 
the self-selection issue, I include an Inverse Mills Ratio derived from the probit regression of the 
first stage. In the second stage the unit of analysis is the dyad. Since I use a two-stage selection 
model, the first-stage variables (instruments), which are firm-specific, do not appear in the second 
stage regressions. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents the pairwise correlation matrix. Most correlations are within acceptable 
limits, indicating that there are no severe collinearity issues to affect these estimations. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 5 reports the effects of institutional distance on selection of international partners for 
exploitation and exploration. In terms of significant effects of control variables, with respect to 
exploitation, most of these effects pertain to ownership strategies (with majority and minority 
holdings trumping the effect of JVs), differentials in terms of market growth potential, and alliance-
specific factors such as previous experience or interactions between two partners, in addition to the 
correction factor for self-selection (i.e., the Inverse Mills ratio). For exploration alliances, in 
addition to these factors, firm knowledge, age and size differentials are also detrimental as well as 
differences in terms of market size. Interestingly, and as expected from a diversity perspective, 
geographical distance has a positive effect on partner selection.  
[Table 5 about here] 
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Going to the hypotheses now, the results support H1 and H2, namely that, ceteris paribus, 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO GLVWDQFH UHGXFHV D SDUWQHU¶V DSSHDO for exploitation alliances. Thus, cognitive, 
normative and regulatory distance have all negative and highly significant coefficients suggesting 
that MNEs prefer partners from similar institutional environments for exploitation. In turn, 
institutional distance appears to be conductive of partnering for exploration, thus supporting H3 
and H4b. Both cognitive and regulatory distance exhibit positive and highly significant coefficients 
in these regressions10. The exception is normative (managerial) distance, which is negatively 
associated with partner selection for exploration alliances. Lastly, it is worthwhile mentioning that 
the effects of all three institutional distances are additive and robust, at least for exploitation (Model 
5), as postulated by the theory (Kostova, 1999). 
Considering the nonlinear nature of the chosen estimator, the above coefficients provide 
limited information above the economic magnitude of these effects. Subsequent analyses carried 
out have explored this issue in more depth by examining the marginal effects for my main variables 
of interest and contrasting them with those of main controls. The full batch of these results is 
available upon request. For this exercise I have used the final results for exploitation and 
exploration alliances reported in Models 5 and respectively 10. Overall, these results are in line 
with my main findings and in terms of magnitudes comparable with other studies that have used 
large dyadic settings (Vasudeva, Spencer, & Teegen, 2013). Thus, all else equal, for an average firm 
when considering prospective partners for exploitation, moving from lower cognitive distance (e.g., 
USA-Guatemala), to a medium one (e.g., USA-South Africa) or a larger one (e.g., USA-China) can 
reduce the probability of selection by up to 2.88 percent. Similarly, the propensity to select distant 
                                                           
10
 To test H4b in Model 9 I use an absolute value of IPR distance as opposed to a simple difference. In this way, a 
positive coefficient would support H4b, while a negative one would support H4a. 
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partners in terms of normative and regulatory institutional backgrounds decreases with distance by 
up to 0.38 percent in the case of very distant regulatory backgrounds (e.g., USA-Angola) and 0.18 
percent for very distant normative ones (e.g., Malaysia-Russia), all else equal. By contrast, for 
selection for exploration alliances, more distant cognitive partners (e.g., USA-Japan) and less 
distant normative ones (e.g., France-Germany) will be more attractive for selection, but the 
magnitude of these effects on selection is slightly smaller (reaching up to 2.16 percent for cognitive 
and 0.07 percent for normative in the case of very distant partners). Overall, these effects provide 
a more intuitive picture regarding the relevance of institutional distance for selection of partners in 
both exploration and exploitation alliances, suggesting that while institutional differences are 
important and on-par with other firm-specific explanations, other factors (such as previous links 
between firms or equity links between prospective partners) tend to prevail in terms of magnitudes. 
 
Robustness checks 
I test the robustness of these results by performing several other analyses. First, I include 
several other cross-country distances (i.e., connectedness, knowledge, economic, and political) 
proposed by Berry et al. (2010). Despite a significant sample size reduction, the coefficients of the 
institutional distances considered remain negative and highly statistically significant, except for 
normative distance, reǦenforcing my prior conclusions. Of all these additional distance measures 
considered, only economic distance is statistically significant, implying that partner selection is 
generally negatively affected by differences in the macroeconomic conditions surrounding 
prospective partners.  
Second, alliance experience is commonly computed in the literature using the number of 
alliances a firm forms in the past 5 or 10 years. Given the time coverage of this dataset (19 years) 
and the strong correlation across time between the number of alliances firms form in a year, I have 
  
29 
opted for a shorter time window of three years. However, as a robustness check I have re-run all 
regressions using more restrictive windows of 5 and 10 years, respectively, for computing the 
alliance experience variable. As expected, the magnitude of these coefficients is smaller (e.g., on 
average, 0.44 for 5-year and 0.34 for 10-year window), but the main results hold despite the severe 
reductions in sample size (counting around 115,000 and respectively 64,000 observations for the 
5- and 10-year window). Results of these robustness checks are not reported here due to space 
constraints but are available upon request. 
Finally, an alternative explanation for the impact of institutional differences on partner 
selection is that these differences could have a discrete rather than a continuous effect. To test this 
possibility, I have used the cultural clusters developed by Ronen & Shenkar (2013) to compute an 
additional control variable (samecultcluster) which is a dummy that equals 1 when the two 
countries in a dyad belong to the same cultural cluster, and 0 otherwise. The results of this analysis 
suggest that sharing the same cultural cluster does not make a difference when it comes to neither 
exploitation or exploration alliances. The sign of samecultcluster remains negative and not 
statistically significant while the main explanatory variables retain similar, signs, magnitudes and 
statistical significance. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although technological alliances have become a popular tool for securing competitive 
advantage (Anand & Khanna, 2000), their success hinges heavily on the selection process (Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008). In an international context, this process involves vetting of potential partners 
for institutionally-related differences that may affect the performance of the alliance (Hitt et al., 
2004; Sarala et al., 2014). This study sheds light on the role played by institutional differences in 
the partner selection process by employing a set of theoretical lenses to disentangle these complex 
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effects. The first such lens, which seeks to infuse strategic objectives into the partner selection 
process, derives from the nature of objective/s of the alliance regarding knowledge seeking and 
learning, and is reflected by the exploration and exploitation tension (Koza & Levin, 1998; Lavie 
& Rosenkopf, 2006). The second lens, which aims to capture the complexity of the international 
HQYLURQPHQW LV6FRWW¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ DPRQJ normative, cognitive, and regulative pillars of 
institutions (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Eden & Miller, 2004) and the distance between countries across 
these institutional dimensions (Kostova, 1999) as a criterion for partner selection.  
Although generated by disparate theoretical currents, these lenses are of complementary 
nature, forming a comprehensive ensemble with which to understand cross-border alliances, and in 
this case, the selection of new partners. One combination of the above lenses, which I explore in 
this paper, is between specific institutional pillars and the strategic logic of exploration versus 
exploitation. The results confirm the core theoretical conjectures of the paper, namely that MNEs 
seek partners from closer institutional backgrounds for exploitative endeavors, driven by efficiency 
and appropriability concerns for their technological assets. In turn, the selection of alliance partners 
for exploration is positively related to institutional distance across cognitive and regulatory 
elements, as the opportunities for technological learning (Teece, 1986) and institutional arbitrage 
(Gaur et al., 2007) are greater. Overall, these contrasting forces provide a balanced and realistic 
view of the institutional gaps between alliance partners, confirming their complex role in the 
selection process. 
Another insight from this work is that the effects of institutions on firm strategies varies 
across different types of institutions considered. I find that distant cognitive and regulatory partners 
are more appealing for exploration alliances given the need to diversify and complement each 
RWKHU¶V NQRZOHGJH 6FKLOGW HW DO  1HYHUWKHOHVV GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WHUPV RI QRUPDWLYH
(managerial) values act as a barrier even for exploration alliances, suggesting that the greater 
transactions costs and uncertainty associated with these differences deter firms from pursuing such 
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partnerships (Olie, 1994; Zhao, 2006). Together, these findings provide a more fine-grained view 
of the effects of institutional distance, and signal the importance of distinguishing between different 
institutional pillars, as their effects might not be uniform in relation to a given firm strategy 
(Yamakawa et al., 2011). 
Last but not least, my results support the idea to view institutional differences as enacted 
by the underlying strategic logic of an alliance, which in this paper is the nature of the knowledge 
search, drawing a clear distinction between exploration and exploitation objectives (March, 1991). 
My theoretical arguments support the antipodal institutional effects in relation to knowledge 
seeking, providing an explanation as to why certain national differences may appear to be 
conducive to certain alliance activities, while inhibiting others (Parkhe, 1991). This finding is at 
odds with the dual strategic role of alliances in accessing and acquiring external knowledge, and 
its subsequent effect on improving its integration and utilization in the production process (Grant 
& BadenǦFuller, 2004).  
 On a theoretical level, this study advocates a convergence between TCE arguments, which 
emphasize complementarity and interdependence as prime rationales for partner selection 
(Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1988), and institutional theory, which views institutions as motivating 
and shaping firm behavior (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). A core contribution lies in 
theorizing how different institutional pillars affect partner selection for alliances, thus 
complementing prior findings on the role that firm-specifics (Annand & Khanna, 2000; Rothaermel 
& Boeker, 2008) and national idiosyncracies (Hitt et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2004) play in this 
selection process. Moreover, the mechanisms through which different institutions affect the 
selection process appear antipodal, contingent on the learning objective ±exploration or 
exploitation- of the alliance (March, 1991), resulting in a ³GRXEOH-HGJHG VZRUG´ HIIHFW RI
institutions on firm strategies. Finally, my findings suggest that cognitive and normative 
differences tend to trump in magnitude the effect of regulatory gaps between prospective partners, 
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consistent with prior, albeit qualitative evidence (Olie, 1994). Thus, regulatory regimes that have a 
key position in the transaction costs argument and are a vital component in the broader economic 
YLHZRI³IRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´QHHGWREHVXSSOHPHQWHGE\LQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZLWKHDFKIXOILOOLQJ
a different role (North 1990; Vasudeva et al., 2013; Krammer, 2017). This resonates also with the 
idea of MNEs internalizing regulatory deficiencies abroad via dedicated internal mechanisms 
designed to reduce appropriation concerns and other negative externalities (Zhao, 2006).  
 
Policy and Managerial Relevance 
These findings draw the attention of policy makers and managers to the importance of 
cognitive (cultural) and normative (managerial) differences that lead to divergent behaviors (Kelly 
et al., 2000) that may affect the success of an alliance (Delerue & Simon, 2009). In particular, large 
cognitive and normative differences are notoriously difficult to overcome due to their tacit nature 
and centennial inertia (Hofstede et al., 2010), and this burden will largely fall on management in 
charge of these inter-firm relationships. Consequently, distant normative and cognitive partners 
deserve more consideration from managers when considering an alliance. At the same time, weaker 
regulatory (i.e., IPR) environments of a prospective partner vis-a-vis the home country of the MNE 
will reduce its appeal as an alliance partner, prompting the significant role policy makers can play 
in facilitating these technological transfers across borders via alliances by improving IPR standards 
and their enforcement (Khoury & Peng, 2011). As a result, host-country managers should lobby 
policy makers for reforms or develop alternative safeguarding mechanisms to attract MNEs as 
technological partners. In exploration alliances, greater institutional distance across cognitive and 
regulatory elements is associated with more appeal for exploration alliances, where firms seek to 
complement each other in terms of knowledge and technologies (Koza & Levin, 1998); however, 
this does not negate the value of a developing a sharing platform to enable effective cooperation 
and knowledge dissemination. Thus, firms must develop and preserve a certain degree of strategic 
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agility when seeking exploration via technological alliances (Weber & Tarba, 2014). 
Complementarily, the development of managerial skills and adherence to international standards 
can help in that, and should become a priority at the level of both nations (i.e., via educational 
curricula) and firms (i.e., via in-house training). 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has several limitations that could serve as starting points for future research. 
First, whereas my theoretical predictions do not rely on any idiosyncratic features of the industry, 
and therefore are generalizable to other empirical settings, the empirical testing relies on one 
industry. Thus, future studies in this area may want to test whether these antipodal effects of 
distance hold across different industrial contexts with significant international coverage to ensure 
sufficient institutional heterogeneity. While these effects could be valid across different industries, 
other idiosyncratic characteristics may result in different magnitudes and rankings for the MNEs 
in terms of priorities and institutional barriers, as suggested by scant work in this area (Olie, 1994). 
Second, I have focused exclusively on the technological and horizontal (i.e., within-
industry) dimensions of alliances, given the concentration of technology production and assets (i.e., 
patents) among top tire producers (Acha & Brusoni, 2005) and the special feature of the tire 
industry, which has been historically dominated by horizontal rather than vertical technological 
exchanges (ERJ, various issues). However, firms in other contexts (e.g., high-tech industries such 
as pharmaceuticals or biotechnology), characterized by complex and dynamic technological 
environments, often adopt a more mixed partnering strategy, which includes both horizontal and 
vertical alliances for exploration and exploitation (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). As such, an 
interesting extension of this work would be to incorporate, particularly in other industry-settings 
that fit better this description, the non-technological and vertical types of alliances formed by focal 
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firms of the industry. This would allow for richer theorizing of institutional and learning rationales 
across a wider array of alliances. 
Third, the nature of the data (i.e., secondary) and empirical setting (i.e., mature, low-tech, 
concentrated industry) limits our ability to control for compatibility, commitment, and 
complementarity of partners to differences in terms of age, size, and knowledge stocks. Ideally, a 
combination of primary and secondary data could further refine our understanding of how and 
when firm specifics trump institutional contingencies for selection of partners. Similarly, future 
studies may test specifically the effects of international experience at the level of the firm (e.g., 
prior presence, or international sales in these markets) or even deeper levels of analysis (e.g.,  
executive international experience, cultural breadth of the board etc.) which are not available for 
many firms in this industry, in particular those from emerging markets. Such research will extend 
the ramifications of the present study by reaching into other key domains of alliance research. 
Finally, despite its popularity in the international business community, inconsistent and 
often contradictory findings regarding the effect of distance on firm international activities have 
raised important operational and methodological challenges (Zaheer et al., 2012; Ambos & 
Håkanson, 2014). The focal objective of this study was to theoretically explain and test empirically 
the antipodal effects of institutional distance on selection of partners. To this end, I have employed 
different operationalization choices for the main independent variables, in line with previous 
studies (e.g., Gaur et al., 2007; He et al., 2013). Nevertheless, these choices rely on several critical 
assumptions that need further examination. For instance, while I specifically allow for asymmetric 
effects in the case of regulatory (IPR) distance, I have treated cognitive and normative differences 
as symmetric under the assumption that the magnitude (but not the direction) of these differences 
matters for the process of alliance partner selection. In turn, recent contributions in this area suggest 
that asymmetry could be important, particularly for certain firm strategies and cultural dimensions 
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2017; Huang, Zhu, & Brass, 2017) and for identifying causal mechanisms 
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behind these relationships (Håkanson et al., 2016). Although in the particular context of the tire 
industry, most exploitation alliances do not exhibit reversals within the dyad in terms of origin of 
focal firms, and exploration alliances work on the assumption that larger distance would be 
beneficial, the magnitude of effects for distances may differ once asymmetry is specifically 
captured. Hence future research may want to explore this issue through primary data collection of 
institutional differences across countries, as perceived by firm managers. These endeavors would 
allow us to closer examine whether such critical assumptions of distance metrics (e.g., symmetry) 
are met in the context of large samples and particular strategies (e.g., technology sharing via 
alliances; M&As; outsourcing; FDI, etc.). 
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Rank Company Country Average sales Percent Tires No. Plants No. Countries R&D spending Employees Investments 
          
          
1 Michelin France 10,892 93 56 14 735 128,165 1,290 
2 Bridgestone Japan 9,703 75 44 19 354 102,165 1,573 
3 Goodyear USA 9,616 86 45 22 449 106,724 805 
4 Continental Germany 3,762 43 21 12 401 63,832 619 
5 Sumitomo Japan 2,903 74 6 3 174 15,000 375 
6 Pirelli ltaly 2,712 45 18 10 216 41,954 500 
7 Yokohama Japan 1,978 72 8 3 104 5,401 175 
8 Toyo Japan 1,140 64 5 3 74 5,848 97 
9 Cooper USA 1,138 53 5 2 40 21,185 150 
10 Kumho South Korea 914 100 4 2 42 5,510 154 
11 Hankook South Korea 826 95 4 2 51 4,152 128 
          
          
 
Table 1: Top global tire producers 
 
Notes: (1) Average sales and percent of sales from tires are computed between 1984-2003 in million US$; R&D spending and investments (in million 
US$), number of plants, number of countries in which these companies are present, and the number of employees, are all for 2003; (2) The top 
three tire producers worldwide account for almost half, while the top 11 producers account for about two thirds of the total R&D expenditures in the 
industry. Source: various issues of the European Rubber Journal. 
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Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
 Managerial Values 
   
   
Competence of managers 0.69 0.52 
Credibility of managers 0.89 0.20 
Corporate boards effectiveness 0.81 0.35 
Employee training 0.77 0.40 
Flexibility and adaptability 0.48 0.77 
International experience of management 0.72 0.49 
Remuneration of management 0.20 0.96 
Social responsibility 0.83 0.31 
Worker's motivation 0.89 0.21 
   
Eigenvalue 4.53 
 
Alpha 0.93  
   
   
 
Table 2: Factor loadings of managerial values items form IMD WCY* 
 
Note: * Bold type indicates best factored items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
      
Partner selection exploit 204,366 0.000 0.016 0.00 1.00 
Partner selection explore 204,366 0.002 0.043 0.00 1.00 
Firm size differential* 204,366 10.614 1.756 0.00 14.82 
Firm age differential* 204,366 3.022 0.951 0.00 4.77 
Firm knowledge differential* 204,366 0.759 1.607 0.00 6.86 
Minority 204,366 0.000 0.019 0.00 1.00 
Majority 204,366 0.001 0.024 0.00 1.00 
JV 204,366 0.001 0.027 0.00 1.00 
Market size differential* 204,366 1.622 1.104 0.00 6.51 
Market growth differential 204,366 0.041 0.035 0.00 0.24 
Geographic contiguity 204,366 0.065 0.247 0.00 1.00 
Geographic distance* 204,366 8.890 0.700 5.09 9.88 
Inverse Mills ratio 204,366 3.565 0.377 1.95 3.90 
Previous alliance experience 204,366 0.162 0.933 0.00 10.00 
Prior interactions 204,366 0.002 0.044 0.00 1.00 
Cognitive distance 204,366 0.020 1.046 -2.80 2.09 
Normative distance 204,366 -0.082 0.850 -1.25 4.45 
Regulatory distance 204,366 0.252 1.017 -2.33 2.90 
      
      
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: Variables marked with an * have followed a logarithmic transformation. 
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No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
             
             
1 Partner selection exploit 1.00 
          
2 Partner selection explore -0.00 1.00         
3 Firm size differential 0.03* -0.00 1.00        
4 Firm age differential 0.02* -0.00 0.09* 1.00       
5 Firm knowledge differential 0.09* 0.02* 0.33* 0.10* 1.00      
6 Minority 0.36* 0.03* 0.01* 0.01* 0.04* 1.00     
7 Majority 0.44* 0.06* 0.02* 0.01* 0.06* 0.01* 1.00    
8 JV 0.37* 0.25* 0.03* 0.01* 0.08* 0.04* 0.17* 1.00   
9 Market size differential 0.01* -0.01* 0.10* 0.01* 0.12* -0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  
10 Market growth differential 0.01* -0.01* -0.04* 0.04* -0.06* 0.01* -0.01* -0.00 -0.02* 1.00 
11 Geographic contiguity -0.01* -0.00 0.01* -0.06* -0.05* 0.00 -0.01* -0.01*  -0.10*  -0.09* 
12 Geographic distance 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.04* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.07* 0.13* 
13 Inverse Mills ratio -0.12* -0.05* -0.25* -0.17* -0.74* 0.04 -0.08* -0.08*  -0.08*   0.06* 
14 Previous alliance experience 0.07* 0.01* 0.07* 0.05* 0.28* 0.01 0.02* 0.01* 0.017* -0.02* 
15 Prior interactions 0.76* 0.27* 0.03* 0.01* 0.08* 0.30 0.38* 0.45* 0.00* 0.01* 
16 Cognitive distance -0.02* 0.02* -0.05* -0.06* 0.01* 0.00 0.01* -0.00 0.01* -0.08* 
17 Normative distance -0.01* -0.00 0.05* 0.02* 0.02* -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 0.08* -0.02* 
18 Regulatory distance -0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.03* 0.20* 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 0.11* -0.07* 
             
             
No Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18    
             
             
11 Geographic contiguity 1.00 
          
12 Geographic distance -0.41* 1.00         
13 Inverse Mills ratio 0.06* 0.03* 1.00        
14 Previous alliance experience -0.02* -0.00 -0.37* 1.00       
15 Prior interactions -0.01* 0.00 -0.12* 0.06* 1.00      
16 Cognitive distance -0.00 0.02* 0.12* -0.00 -0.01* 1.00     
17 Normative distance -0.07* 0.00 -0.03* -0.03* -0.01* -0.01* 1.00    
18 Regulatory distance -0.08* 0.10* -0.06* -0.00 0.01* 0.15* 0.03* 1.00   
             
             
 
Note: * denotes correlations significant at 5 percent or better 
 
Table 4: Paired correlations 
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Variables / Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
   
Exploit 
    
Explore 
  
           
           
Firm size differential 0.13+ 0.11 0.12 0.13+ 0.10 -0.24+ -0.26 -0.26** -0.24+ -0.28+ 
 
[0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.13] [0.16] [0.12] [0.13] [0.16] 
Firm age differential 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -1.19*** -0.45 -1.18*** -1.04*** -0.43 
 [0.21] [0.20] [0.21] [0.21] [0.20] [0.24] [0.27] [0.22] [0.25] [0.26] 
Firm knowledge differential 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 -1.31*** -1.58*** -1.34*** -1.20*** -1.54*** 
 [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.11] [0.28] [0.23] [0.26] [0.28] [0.23] 
Minority 8.45*** 8.45*** 8.51*** 8.41*** 8.45*** -5.02*** -5.81*** -4.23** -5.46*** -5.65*** 
 [0.79] [0.76] [0.77] [0.78] [0.76] [1.73] [1.69] [1.76] [1.56] [1.67] 
Majority 7.26*** 7.08*** 7.51*** 7.15*** 7.13*** 7.71*** 10.10*** 8.65*** 6.46*** 10.58*** 
 [0.83] [0.57] [0.97] [0.81] [0.61] [1.15] [1.77] [1.24] [1.19] [2.04] 
JV 4.77*** 4.84*** 4.92*** 4.77*** 5.03*** 7.18*** 8.25*** 7.20*** 6.77*** 8.11*** 
 [0.53] [0.56] [0.54] [0.52] [0.57] [1.26] [1.29] [1.24] [1.27] [1.32] 
Market size differential 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 -1.96*** -2.72*** -1.80*** -2.18*** -2.35*** 
 [0.17] [0.16] [0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.39] [0.81] [0.35] [0.39] [0.71] 
Market growth differential 13.97*** 9.59*** 14.42*** 13.71*** 9.68*** -78.96*** -117.95*** -78.11***  -86.84***  -115.53*** 
 [3.33] [3.35] [3.08] [3.32] [2.94] [20.42] [24.07] [19.74] [20.68] [21.73] 
Geographic contiguity 0.13 -0.21 0.13 0.16 -0.17 1.10 1.08 0.57 1.46 0.76 
 [0.72] [0.66] [0.70] [0.71] [0.65] [0.96] [1.76] [1.01] [1.03] [1.78] 
Geographic distance -0.18 -0.25 -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 2.44*** 2.66*** 2.33*** 2.77*** 2.40** 
 [0.21] [0.23] [0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.49] [0.96] [0.41] [0.50] [0.97] 
Inverse Mills ratio -2.15 -2.10*** -2.14*** -2.14*** -2.06*** -9.87*** -11.07*** -9.92*** -9.07*** -10.62*** 
 [0.343] [0.41] [0.34] [0.36] [0.45] [0.98] [1.43] [0.99] [0.95] [1.50] 
Previous alliance experience 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.36*** -0.31*** -0.58*** -0.37*** -0.26** -0.59*** 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.11] [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.14] 
Prior interactions 8.65*** 8.85*** 8.77*** 8.66*** 8.99*** 4.77*** 4.61*** 4.67*** 4.92*** 4.52*** 
 [0.46] [0.51] [0.51] [0.46] [0.54] [0.49] [0.81] [0.51] [0.49] [0.75] 
Cognitive distance  -0.47***   -0.45***  4.78***   4.76*** 
  [0.12]   [0.13]  [0.83]   [0.91] 
Normative distance   -0.29**  -0.25**   -0.68**  -0.53+ 
   [0.12]  [0.12]   [0.28]  [0.32] 
Regulatory distance    -0.17** -0.10**    1.53*** 0.18 
    [0.08] [0.05]    [0.18] [0.28] 
           
N 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 204,366 
Pseudo R-square 0.745 0.754 0.746 0.748 0.756 0.666 0.730 0.666 0.704 0.740 
           
           
 
Table 5: Institutional distance and partner selection for exploitation and exploration alliances. Rare-event logistic regression 
 
Notes: The dependent variable (Exploit, Explore) equals 1 if the potential partner in the dyad is selected for an exploitation (respectively exploration) 
technological alliance, and 0 otherwise; All models include time dummies and an intercept, which not reported here due to space constraints; 
Standard errors are clustered on the dyad. +, ** and *** indicate variables that are significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1%. 
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Appendix. 
 
Coding Information Year Focal firm Partner(s) 
Exploration Sumitomo will participate in technology exchanges with BTR-Dunlop via the global operations of the Dunlop Group 1993 
Sumitomo Rubber 
Industries (Japan) BTR-Dunlop (UK) 
Exploration 
This agreement aims at setting an industry standard and broadening the appeal 
and availability for run-flat tires; it consists of jointly operated R&D operations 
based in the Netherlands and license each other's respective run-flat 
technologies. Goodyear has developed run-flat technology that mounts on a 
conventional rim, while Michelin has an integrated wheel-and-tire system. 
2000 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (USA)  
Group Michelin SA 
(France) 
Exploration Pirelli and Continental cooperate on developing new tyre truck technologies and have signed an off-take production agreement 2003 
Continental AG 
(Germany) Pirelli Group (Italy) 
Exploration Pirelli, Goodyear, Sumitomo, Hankook and Michelin cooperate on the GHYHORSPHQWRI0LFKHOLQ¶V3$;UXQ-flat tire-wheel system 2003 
Group Michelin SA 
(France)  Pirelli Group (Italy) 
Exploration Nokian shares some of its tire technology with Bridgestone Corp. which holds 18.9 percent stake in the company. 2002 Nokian (Finland) 
Bridgestone Corp. 
(Japan) 
Exploitation Pirelli Group has agreed to provide production technology and know-how to Alexandria Tyre Co. which plans to open a new production plant in early 1991. 1990 Pirelli Group (Italy) 
Alexandria Tyre Co 
(Egypt) 
Exploitation Vredestein has signed a long-term agreement to licence the technology and production of Vredestein brand tyres to PT Elganperdana. 1997 
Vredestein 
(Netherlands)  
PT Elganperdana 
(Indonesia) 
Exploitation 
Sumitomo Rubber will provide turnkey and process technology on a contractual 
basis to Bonsa Tyre, Chongqing Tyre Factory and Liaoning Tyre via BTR Dunlop 
Ltd in South Africa, which is overseeing the former Dunlop International Technical 
and Trading Services in Birmingham, UK. 
1997 
Sumitomo Rubber 
Industries Ltd. 
(Japan) 
Bonsa Tyre co Ltd 
(Ghana); Chongqing 
Tyre Factory (China); 
Liaoning Tyre 
(China). 
Exploitation 
Continental will outsource many of its motorcycle and scooter tires to Metro Tyres' 
dedicated new plant in Ludhiana, India. Also, the partners have signed long-term 
agreements covering both off-take production and technological support. 
2002 Continental AG (Germany) 
Metro Tyres Ltd 
(India) 
Exploitation Michelin has formed a joint venture with Tigar AD to make and market tyres and tubes in Yugoslavia. In addition Michelin will provide tire technology to Tigar AD. 2003 
Group Michelin SA 
(France) Tigar AD (Serbia) 
 
Table 6: Examples of technological alliances considered and coding choices 
 
